The economic literature has discussed the links between trust and gender, and trust and social capital. Given that some empirical evidence shows also that gender and trust are somehow related and specifically women tend to trust less than men, I try to investigate the effect of social capital on generalized trust, controlling also for the "gender effect". This latter could be due to the fact that women are less prone to invest in social capital than men, as the literature highlights. Using the tools of experimental economy, I performed the same experiment in Oslo, Leuven and Torino, in order to obtain a mixed Western European sample. In this one I included Scandinavia, Central and Mediterranean Europe. My measure of social capital is more complete than the usual one: I add informal networks (such as phone conversations, time spent with friends, etc.) to formal ones (basically voluntary associations). Analysing the obtained results through both comparisons of conditional means and econometrics, I find out some influence of social capital on trust. Furthermore, also after controlling for social capital, gender differences persist still. Thus I can conclude that behavioural differences due to gender are not a mere reflex of different investments in social capital. I also found evidence that some kinds of formal and informal networks exert positive influence on generalized trust.
Mixed evidence
In 1993 an American sociologist, Robert Putnam, made economists (re)interested in social capital. Although social capital is a concept whose borders are not clearly identified 1 , it has been widely used in economics during last years. Putnam (1993) focuses on the relationship existing between social capital and the quality of institutions, but economists have widened research to development, public goods, etc. as Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2002) and Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) highlight.
On another side, a new stream of economics has fast grown during last years:
behavioural economy, which has been empirically supported by experimental economists.
Through experiments it has been proved that human behaviour is lead not only by profit maximization, but there are also other factors influencing it. For example Anderson, Mellor and Milyo (2004) show that social capital affects contributions in a public good game.
Both streams have contributed to the extant economic literature with several findings; among these a common point seems to emerge very often: women tend to invest less in social capital, and they tend to trust less [see Croson and Buchan (1999) ]. This can be due to genetic factors, or lesser trust could reflect also lower investments in social capital, as several scholars point out social capital as one of the main promoters of generalized trust. In addition, it would be interesting to study the contribution of social capital to the outcomes of a basic investment game.
This paper measures generalized trust through the basic setup of Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) 's trust game, and social capita partly à la Putnam (1993) through time spent within different types of voluntary associations, and partly by introducing other indicators representing informal networks 2 . Among these informal networks I include the usage of telephone; differently from Fisman and Khanna (1999) I account for time spent on phone calls with friends instead of the raw number of possessed telephones. As Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) show, other indicators of social capital are possible, but I prefer to use more traditional ones for purposes of comparability with other analogous studies.
The aim is twofold: firstly I want to analyze the link between social capital and the outcomes of the trust game; secondly if social capital exerts an effect on generalized trust, as measured by the game, I would like to see if the gender effect is still persistent. In the lights of Karlan (2005) , I prefer refer to this game as "investment game".
In order to answer these questions, I repeated the basic treatment of the investment game in three Western European countries (namely Belgium, Italy and Norway) to work on a wide and composite dataset, characterized by a small socio-cultural variance 3 . Limiting cultural variance is very important, as membership in (and thus time spent within) associations is found to be a relevant indication for some cultures, but not for some others, as discussed in Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2002) . In addition Henrich (2000) detects strong influence of culture on the results of an ultimatum game, and Henrich et al. (2002) found that people " […] when faced with a novel situation (the experiment), they looked for analogous in their daily experience […] and then acted in a way appropriate for the analogous situation." 4 They continue showing that this "appropriate way" is strongly cultural-dependent. Participants were all selected as pseudo-volunteers according to Eckel and Grossman (2000) definition, and they were all undergraduate students.
The main results of this paper support the hypothesis that social capital is positively linked to the outcomes of a trust game, though some effect is weak 5 ; secondly the gender effect is persistent even after controlling for social capital.
Experimental design and procedure
The investment game originally proposed by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) is a two-player and two-stage game. The set up is as follows. Participants are divided into two groups, A and B. Each person A i is randomly and anonymously matched to person B i . In the first stage A i receives the possibility of splitting between himself and B i the notional sum of S euro 6 . We denote as α i S the amount given to B i by A i , where α i ∈ [0, 1]. The quantity α i S is interpreted as a measure of A i 's generalized interpersonal trust. Molm, Takahashi and Peterson (2000) point out that this behaviour is more manifest when exchanges are non-3 Notice that cultural background (at national level) exerts strong effects on the outcomes of a game, as shown, for example, by Henrich et al. (2002) . 4 Henrich et al. (2002) 
where m is the possessed quantity of money. No other factor affects utility. As it can be seen in Croson and Buchan (1999) , the Nash equilibrium occurs in a small minority of cases; as Bouckaert and Dhaene (2004) point out "In experimental settings where anonymous players play the game only once, a typical finding is that player [A] transfers a positive amount to player [B] , and that player [B] responds by transferring a positive amount back to player [A] ."
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In my design both types of players share the same set of information; this means that both receive a full description of the game before starting to play it 10 . At the end a couple is randomly drawn and paid according to their decisions. This lottery is a necessary incentive for the participants to take the game seriously. In addition they are paid separately, in order to prevent them meeting. This is important to rule out any psychological pressure: if they met, they would prefer to seem generous, hence amounts would be affected by generosity. According to Eckel and Grossman (2000) , our players are pseudo-volunteers, in the sense that they were not asked whether they desired to participate or not; they were just involved in the experiment. All of them received a copy of instructions (the same for both groups), a paper on which they had to write down their decision and a two-page questionnaire. The experiment lasted about 15 minutes. The same decision papers (containing A's choices) were randomly passed to players of type B. The two stages took place on different days and in different buildings. In order to ensure maximum neutrality of the environment, we chose the course classroom. Eckel and Grossman (2000) would raise some distrust in our recruiting mechanism.
Their experiment points out that pseudo-volunteers tend to evaluate monetary incentives less than recruited participants 12 . I do not want to rebut this outcome here; nevertheless I believe that there is no certainty about which method is best or least unbiased. Volunteers could be motivated by self-selection, i.e. by a subjective higher evaluation of money, and thus they could constitute a particular sub-sample of the population 13 . Since there is no evidence against this interpretation of Eckel and Grossman's results, I do not account for the selection procedure as a source of bias.
Additional disturbances could have arisen if the Professor of the course had invited his students to participate. In such a case they could have behaved to please him. In order to rule out this possible effect, no information was communicated before the game took place.
Furthermore, the experimenter and not the Professor explained the rules and distributed the copies 14 .
As stated above, I replicated the standard investment game, as described in Berg et al. (1995) . Each experiment was a one-off (i.e. not repeated).
In order to provide an incentive for participants to play according to their real preferences, a lottery was attached to the experiment. A couple for each city received a payment equal to the final amounts produced by their decisions. The initial sum was sufficiently high to constitute a good incentive, despite the low winning probability.
A total of 506 students were involved in phase A and a total of 345 as players B. I analyze group B's results also through an ordered probit and a multinomial logit..
In particular group B is divided into three categories: the first one (denoted as 0) gathers players B who sent back an amount of money such that their A counterpart ends up worse than them; the second subgroup (indicated by 1) represents those players B who decided to equally split the total cake; finally the last sub-sample (denoted by 2) collects individuals of type B, who chose to pass back a sum such that their A partner ended up better than them.
On one hand these outcomes can be ordered, as players can calculate their counterpart's 15 These figures refer to valid sheets. Some students did not understand the rules of the game, and therefore their answers were dropped. As players were pseudo -volunteers [see Eckel and Grossman (2000) ], there was no perfect match in the number of group components. Hence the difference (particularly big in the Flemish case) between groups A and groups B.
final payoff. Hence an ordered probit seems to be the most appropriate tool. On the other hand, using an ordered probit means to impose the restriction that the magnitude of marginal effects is always the same across categories. A multinomial logit approach could avoid this problem, and (or though) does not necessarily impose to data the order given by the experimenter. However, the shortcoming of probit estimation affects only the coefficients, but not the marginal effects. In addition a major problem with multinomial logit is that it very likely that the hypothesis of independence from irrelevant alternatives does not hold.
As a consequence, ordered probit estimates (particularly marginal effects) appear to be the best to use.
Given the limited availability of observations, some networks show an exiguous usage; as done in a previous paper some associations can be clustered according to their ends; furthermore informal nets (especially those linked to active communication) can be grouped as well (though in this case no exiguity of observations exists). As a result, I gather pro-social associations, and communication networks.
As regards descriptive statistics, I also perform a comparison of means based on
Hotelling's method. The aim of this is to investigate the effect of gender, ethnic feeling, nationality and geographical position, when all the other variables are simply not considered. This method also allows analysis as to whether there be significant differences in stocks of social capital across genders and countries. This point is important to verify if students' self -reported social capital is consistent to the data of the World Value Survey.
Accordingly with Migheli (2007) I expect a decreasing stock of social capital going south, and, as a consequence, a diminishing value for both trust and reciprocity.
Results

Descriptive statistics.
I There is a possible "ethnic" interpretation for the "Flemish" anomaly: the two linguistic groups of the country (French and Flemish) have always been in severe contrast.
Although all the students knew their opponent to be a Flemish person 19 , problems linked to the internal situation could be responsible for the low level of trust displayed by Flemish players.
For group B to be born in a foreign country does not affect the amount passed back. This is true both for the whole sample and for each national subgroup as well.
Gender does not affect for reciprocity. At least, this is the result of my sample, and it holds for the usual subdivisions. In reality I expected some influence of respondent's sex also in phase B. Unfortunately I have to highlight an unwanted anomaly. As declared, A's sheets were passed to players B randomly. In the Italian case, chance had it that women received on average more than men (288.25€ vs. 226.81€ with a significance of 90%).
Could this fact have biased the results? I am not able to answer this question. However, taking passed amounts in percentage of received ones, as I did here, should avoid any problem linked to chance.
Self -reported ethnicity exerts some influence. In particular data show that players who feel they belong to their region passed back 17.38% of what they received against 28.70% of the others (significant at 99% level). Students feeling they belonged to their own country gave back 29.17% vs. 23.24% (significant at 99% level). If I decompose the sample in the three citizenships, the differences are no longer significant. Looking into data deeper suggest that at the aggregate level the regional sentiment captures the Flemish component.
As we already know, the Flemish passed back significantly less that the others, therefore the shown aggregate difference has to be imputed to nationalist differences and not to the selfreported nationality. These results are a partial proof of my initial claim: using descriptive statistics can lead to biased results due to hidden effects.
In the next subsection I will comment upon the results coming out from an OLS regression.
Econometric results
The research about so -called "experimetrics" is at its embryonic stage [see Camerer (2003) and Bardsley and Moffatt (2003) ]. The aim of this branch of econometrics is to provide experimenters with powerful tools to investigate experimental data.
Unfortunately, at the moment this discipline is still too underdeveloped to be used here. In a previous paper [see Migheli (2006) ] I analysed data through an instrumental variable regression using GMM technique. The hours spent out with friends were instrumented by using an important variable, living in a student's room, which is not exploitable in the whole sample, as Italian students are used to living in their parents' home. Hence I would rule out almost an entire part of my sample. As a consequence I use OLS here for the whole dataset.
Moreover, a Durbin -Wu -Hausman test shows that no endogeneity problem affects data.
Thus an OLS regression is consistent. However heteroschedasticity may be present, then I use robust standard errors.
I will comment here on the results for Group A. I will distinguish between formal and informal networks, as previously assessed. I will also control for nationality, using the Italians as a basic case. Several formal organizations apart from one display a significant positive result. Tables 1 and 2 summarize econometric results for group A. In Table 1 networks are analyzed one by one, whilst some aggregation is performed in Table 2 . Table 1 Phone calls do not display any significant effect, even though the coefficient is strongly positive and almost significant (85% level). This result is only partially different from Fisman and Khanna (2001) , who found a positive and significant contribution of the number of owned telephones. Also time spent out with friends is not significantly related to passed amounts. Nevertheless, I found out some evidence that also informal networks are part of social capital.
The usual gender effect is detected: male players gave more than female colleagues.
This can be due to the different perception of risk, fairness and opportunities of the two sexes, as outlined by Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) and Simpson (2003) . Apparently the fact that women associate less than men [see Migheli (2007) ] is also mirrored by their lower level of generalized trust.
Self-reported ethnicity is not significant, but Norwegian players display a higher level of trust, whilst Flemish participants are not different from Italians (here taken as basic case). Table 2 Participation in religious associations matters: the coefficient is significant. This is consistent with my initial claims. Religious capital can be considered a part of social capital.
On the one hand it generates social contacts, and hence joining a religious organization is equivalent to joining any other association; on the other hand religious values also promote civil values, and hence they further increase social capital [see Putnam (1993) ].
People spending time in associations caring for the environment and for animals' rights also reciprocate more. The sign of the latter coefficient is in contrast with the sign of In what follows, I examine the results of the ordered probit estimate. My dependent variable is defined above. In practice this is another way to treat the same problem as before, but now I am considering the total end result (although from player A's viewpoint). Again, I
require STATA to perform the calculations using robust standard errors.
The main results are quite similar to the ones obtained in the previous case, with some difference. The larger the amount of money received, the lower the probability for A to end up better than B. This means that in general when B players received a huge quantity of money, they did not pass back a sum sufficient to restore equality between the two players. On the other hand when A passed a low amount of his initial endowment, it is likely that A ended better than B.
In the probit regression, to be Flemish does decrease the probability for A to end up better than B, whilst the opposite happens for Norwegians. The basic case is represented by the Italians, as usual. If we rely on La Ferrara (2000) and Miguel and Gugerty (2005) , living in an environment characterized by ethnic tensions lowers the level of social capital. Hence the results I got are still consistent with my initial hypotheses.
Only formal networks display significant coefficients in probit estimates. In particular I can highlight that spending time within own-faculty associations increases the probability of having A better than B. Also participation in other students' organizations, in environmental groups and associations for the protection of animals' rights enhances reciprocity. These findings are consistent with my initial claim that formal organizations foster trust and reciprocity. In other words, that social capital, measured as in the present work, promotes both generalized trust and reciprocity. Informal networks, ethnicity and gender are not influent in this case.
In conclusion, I have some positive evidence in favour of my initial hypotheses. In particular not only formal networks (the traditional measure of social capital) but also informal ones are part of social capital, as they promote trust and reciprocity.
When considering marginal effects, we can notice that the probability of passing from 1 (even final distribution of money) to 2 (A ends up with more than B) is positively linked with time spent in formal organizations (especially students', environmental, and others). Informal networks do not display significant correlations with the dependent variable. However, this could be due to the fact that absolute values for these variables are in a wider range than those of formal organizations. To be Flemish exhibits a negative significant coefficient, while the opposite happens for being Norwegian.
Results for passing from 1 to 0 (B ends up with more money than A) show several negative and significant coefficients. Again they are all among formal associations (students', environmental, groups for the defence of animals' rights). Only time spent in political parties has a positive coefficient. The dummy for being Norwegian shows a negative coefficient.
The inclusion of aggregated variables (those used for Group A) in the analysis of data for Group B does not change the results. Estimates (not shown) indicate that aggregated variables are not significant, while some of their components singularly taken are. This notable difference can be due to the fact that passed amounts proxy different dependent variables; hence it would be incorrect to expect the same controls to exert the same (or similar) influence. So it would be erroneous to suppose that controls be significant in both cases.
Gender, social capital and the investment game
In the present work I attained three main results. The first one is providing evidence that also informal networks matter for trust and reciprocity, and hence they should be considered part of individual social capital. The second is an investigation about which kind of networks foster generalized trust and reciprocity. The third issue is evaluating the gender effect net of social capital. The rationale for this last point comes from the observation that women join voluntary associations less than men [see Migheli (2007) ].
My results provide evidence for informal networks to be considered among components of social capital. In particular telecommunications show significant coefficients.
As for the types of networks that I should consider as social capital, we can notice that some organizations have no significant effect. In particular this is the case of sports and cultural associations 25 . Hypothetical networks due to siblings are either not significant or not captured by considering the number of brothers and sisters. Surprisingly the time spent out with friends is not significantly correlated with trust and reciprocity. However I think that self reported figures for this variable could be distorted by subjective interpretation: some respondents could also have included the time spent in some organizations with friends. In this case duplication would occur, and in any case data about this variable would be inconsistent internally.
We observe the usual gender effect: women trust less than men. Although a huge amount of literature has recently appeared on this topic [see Croson and Buchan (1999) , Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), Camerer (2003) and Simpson (2003) ], a definitive explanation for this phenomenon has not yet been provided. However my results are in line with the general international evidence [see Croson and Buchan (1999) (1993) and Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) ], and most of the literature considers generalized trust as a product of social capital [see Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) and Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) ]. As a consequence of all this, the lower level of women's trust could simply be due to females having a lower level of social capital. Hence by controlling for this last variable, the gender effect should have weakened or disappeared. This is not the case for trust. As for reciprocity the problem is more controversial [see Camerer (2003) ]. My conclusion here is then that a gender effect does exist, which is not linked to the endowment of social capital (provided that I am measuring the latter in a right way).
In =0.118 Dependent variable: passed amount (A) and percentage of received amount (B) Note: participation in both formal and informal networks is measured in hours per week, but SMS measured in absolute numbers. Subjuective ethnicity was measured by the question: "Which cultural-ethnic group do you feel to belong to more?" 
